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230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
KERRY SORENSEN : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, J 
VS. ! 
MIRIAM MORRISON J 
Defendant/Appellant. ; 
\ Case No. 930806 CA 
: Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Miriam Morrison ("Morrison") appeals the decision 
of the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, State of Utah, 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code §78-2a-3(d). 
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Can a tenant, on equal standing with another tenant, and 
without the consent or knowledge of the property owner, use our 
State's unlawful detainer statute to evict the other tenant? 
Because the trial court's decision on this issue rests on 
both statutory interpretation and legislative intent, the court 
should apply the "correction of error" standard of review. 
Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Kirkbride, 821 
P.2d 1136 (Utah 1992). 
2. What standard should be applied in unlawful detainer 
actions in determining whether a tenant may be evicted as a 
nuisance? 
Because the trial court's decision on this issue rests on 
both statutory interpretation and legislative intent, the court 
should apply the "correction of error" standard of review. 
Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Kirkbride, 821 
P.2d 1136 (Utah 1992)• 
3, Did Morrison's acts, as found by the trial court, as a 
matter of law, amount to a nuisance for which a tenant may be 
evicted? 
Because neither party is challenging the findings of fact 
entered by the trial court, but Morrison is instead challenging 
the application of those facts to the standard determined by the 
court to be applicable, this issue is a question of law and the 
court should apply the "correction of error" standard of review. 
Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Kirkbride, 821 
P.2d 1136 (Utah 1992). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are controlling in this action: 
Utah Code §78-36-3 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less 
than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(b)(i) . . • in cases where the owner, his 
designated agent, or any successor in estate 
of the owner • • . has served notice 
requiring him to quit; 
(d) . . . when he sets up or carries on any 
unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he 
suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises 
any nuisance . . . and remains in possession after 
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; 
Utah Code §78-36-5 
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those 
prescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the 
premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful 
detention of the premises underlet to him. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellee Kerry Sorensen ("Sorensen") and Morrison, along 
with one other person signed a lease as tenants and were 
roommates living in a house in Midvale, Utah. [R. 26, 34] The 
parties lived together for about a month and a half when Sorensen 
filed an unlawful detainer action against Morrison under Utah 
Code §78-36-3(1)(d). [R. 1] Morrison moved to dismiss 
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Sorensen's action on the basis that she was a co-tenant and 
roommate in the same house, and that Sorensen could not bring an 
unlawful detainer action against her because their relationship 
was not one of landlord and tenant. [R. 9] The trial court 
rejected Morrison's argument and after finding her to be a 
nuisance ordered her evicted from the premises she had rented. 
[R. 31] Morrison now appeals the decision of the lower court. 
B„ Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Michael 
L. Hutchings on December 1, 1993, in the Third Circuit Court, 
Salt Lake Department. [R. 26, 34] The Court heard testimony 
from numerous witnesses, including the parties. [R. 42] 
Following this testimony and closing arguments from counsel, the 
Court orally entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order. [R. 42] These findings were later reduced to writing, 
signed by the Court, and are the subject of this appeal. [R. 26, 
34] 
C. Statement of the Facts 
After responding to an advertisement for a roommate placed 
by Sorensen, Morrison entered into an agreement with Sorensen and 
JoAnne Wolfenden to lease a house as co-tenants. [R. 26, 44-46] 
Each roommate signed the lease agreement, making each co-tenant 
jointly and severally liable for the covenants contained in the 
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lease. [R. 26, 34] 
The parties in this case did not get along almost from the 
beginning of the lease. [R. 44-46] They did not communicate 
well, did not spend time in each other's company, and could not 
agree on who was entitled to use the common areas of the house. 
[R. 44-46] In addition, Sorensen was conducting a business from 
the living room of the house, an activity that was not part of 
the parties' agreement. [R. 44-46] Morrison attempted to deal 
with this uncomfortable situation by suggesting that the parties 
attend mediation together. [R.45] Sorensen was unresponsive to 
this idea, and instead served Morrison with a three-day notice to 
quit for nuisance on November 11, 1993. [R. 4-5] 
When Morrison did not vacate the premises, Sorensen served 
her with a summons and complaint on November 23, 1993, claiming 
under Utah Code §78-36-3(1)(d) that Morrison was in unlawful 
detainer. [R. 1-5] He alleged that Morrison was a nuisance in 
that she had disrupted his business dealings by erasing messages 
from an answering machine, removing a note from the door to the 
house, causing a fire hazard by using the stove, and disturbing 
his sleep. [R. 4-5] Morrison answered Sorensen's complaint on 
November 29, 1993, and moved to dismiss the action based on the 
fact that Sorensen was a tenant on equal standing with herself 
and therefore the remedies under Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statute 
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were not available to him. [R. 9-12] 
On December 1, 1993, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings 
denied Morrison's motion to dismiss and orally ordered Morrison 
to vacate the premises she had rented. [R. 26, 34] Judge 
Hutchings' decision was reduced to a written Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on December 23, 1993. [R. 26, 34] 
Morrison filed her Notice of Appeal on December 15, 1993. [R. 
29] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This court should overturn the decision of the lower court 
because Sorensen is not a landlord and therefore is not entitled 
to relief under the unlawful detainer statute. 
This court should find that in order to be evicted as a 
nuisance, a tenant must continuously or repeatedly engage in 
behavior that substantially and unreasonably, in light of the 
circumstances surrounding of the tenancy, interferes with the 
rights of another of the landlord's tenants. By applying this 
standard to the facts at hand, this court should hold that 
Morrison was not a nuisance and should therefore reverse the 
decision of the trial court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
A TENANT ON EQUAL STANDING WITH ANOTHER TENANT IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER UTAH'S UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE, 
Sorensen is not entitled to relief under Utah's unlawful 
detainer statute because the parties in this action are co-
tenants, not landlord and tenant, or tenant and subtenant, as is 
required under this statute. Utah case law, decisions from other 
jurisdictions, and an examination of our own unlawful detainer 
statute shows that the remedy of a summary eviction is only 
available to a landlord in a landlord and tenant relationship. 
Utah Code §78-36-3 states that: 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less 
than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(d) . . . when he sets up or carries on any 
unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he 
suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises 
any nuisance . . . and remains in possession after 
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; 
This section indicates that a tenant may be evicted for nuisance, 
but it does not indicate who can maintain the action to evict. 
The statute in another section does refer to who may serve 
an eviction notice. Utah Code §78-36-3 (l)(b)(i) provides for an 
eviction at the end of a rental period and states that "the 
owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the 
owner" may serve a notice terminating a tenancy under this 
provision. 
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Further, Utah Code §78-36-5 states specifically that "[a] 
tenant may take proceedings similar to those prescribed in this 
chapter to obtain possession of a premises let to an undertenant 
in case of the unlawful detention of the premises let to him." 
Such specific language in this section of the code indicates that 
the legislature intended to limit unlawful detainer actions to 
parties whose relationship is either one of landlord and tenant, 
or tenant and subtenant (which is in actuality a landlord and 
tenant relationship). 
Sorensen should therefore be precluded from maintaining his 
action against Morrison because he is not in the position of a 
landlord with his co-tenant. 
The Supreme Court of Utah addressed this question in 1925. 
The Court stated that ,f[i]f the defendant is not the tenant of 
the plaintiff. . . he has a full and complete defense to the 
action." Williams v. Nelson, 237 P. 217, 222 (Utah 1925). 
Decisions from other jurisdictions and accepted "black 
letter law" agree that this interpretation of summary eviction 
proceedings is the correct one. Nearly every jurisdiction in the 
country has an eviction statute similar to Utah's and many courts 
have held that the remedy of a summary eviction is only available 
to a landlord against their tenant. 
Corpus Juris Secundum states that as "a general rule under 
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the various statutes, a relationship of landlord and tenant must 
exist between the parties to sustain a summary proceeding to 
recover possession of the premises." 52A C.J.S. §752 b.(l). 
The Supreme Court of Montana has stated that "[w]henever the 
unlawful detainer statutes . . . are brought into operation it is 
the rule that such an action may only prevail where the relation 
of landlord-tenant exists." Kransky v. Hensleigh, 409 P.2d 537, 
539 (Mont. 1965). 
The California Supreme Court agreed as long ago as 1917. 
That court stated that "[t]he action of unlawful detainer can be 
maintained only where the relation of landlord and tenant 
subsists between the parties to the action and hence it becomes 
material to determine whether parties stand in that relation to 
each other." Francis v. West Virginia Oil, 162 P.394 (Cal. 
1917). 
There is other relevant Utah case law which should be 
considered in connection with this question. In 1979 the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that the "unlawful detainer statute is a 
summary proceeding and in derogation of the common law. It 
provides a severe remedy, and this Court has previously held that 
it must be strictly complied with before the cause of action may 
be maintained." Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 853 (Utah 
1979). See also, American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 464 P.2d 592 
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(Utah 1970); Van Zwerden v. Ferrar, 393 P.2d 468 (Utah 1964); 
Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952). 
The Court discussed this statute again in 1991 stating that 
the "statute grants the landlord a summary court proceeding to 
evict a tenant who has violated some express or implied provision 
of the lease." P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1020 
(Utah 1991). The court continues, recognizing that this is a 
remedy only available to landlords: "The remedy for a successful 
landlord is restitution of the premises, treble damages, and 
recovery for waste and rent due." 818 P.2d at 1020 (emphasis 
added). 
A summary eviction through the unlawful detainer statute is 
a remedy available only to landlords. However, a tenant 
experiencing problems with another tenant is not without a 
remedy. That remedy is to notify the landlord of the problems 
and allow the landlord to take action. The landlord covenants to 
provide quiet enjoyment to each tenant. If the landlord is 
notified of a breach of this covenant, it is the landlord who 
must take action to rectify the situation. 
POINT TWO 
THIS COURT SHOULD DEFINE A NUISANCE STANDARD 
APPLICABLE TO UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTES. 
While there is case law in Utah concerning nuisance in other 
settings, these standards do not apply specifically to 
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landlord/tenant relationships• This court should adopt a 
standard combining established nuisance definitions with the 
decisions from courts that have considered this question as it 
relates to the landlord and tenant relationship. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that 
every person has a right to use his own 
property as he sees fit so long as that use 
does not invade the rights of his neighbor 
unreasonably and substantially. Absolute 
quiet and repose is impossible and everyone 
must assume some burden of ordinary 
activities of others in the vicinity. 
Johnson v. Mount Qqden, 460 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1969). The 
theory that circumstances surrounding the activity in question 
should be considered developed into a series of factors in the 
state of New York. 
[T]enants are bound to a rule of reasonable 
conduct, taking into consideration the 
housing accommodations, the environment, the 
neighborhood, the size of the family, and the 
ordinary conduct of people living under the 
conditions in question. The application of 
this rule requires recognition of the acute 
housing shortage but it also demands that the 
tenant conduct himself as a reasonable person 
over a period of time, having regard to the 
comfortable enjoyment of the premises by 
others. 
DiLella v. O'Brien, 68 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (City Court of Albany 
1946) . 
The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
has stated that for a landlord to show a nuisance "there must be 
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a continuousness or recurrence of the things, facts, or acts 
which constitute the nuisance, deriving from the notion of 
unreasonable use." Reese v. Wells, 73 A.2d 899, 902 (Municipal 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 1950). The Utah 
Supreme Court agreed in stating that in order to sustain a 
finding of nuisance it must be demonstrated that "the actor 
maintained the condition after he knew that it was causing an 
invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land," 
Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 577 (Utah 
1985) . 
Finally, the conduct must actually disturb another tenant in 
order to constitute a nuisance. The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
for example, held that "it is not enough that the tenant's 
conduct is disturbing; it must be disturbing to other tenants of 
the landlord." Seidel v. Cahaila, 29 A.2d 628, 629 (N. J. 1943) 
Morrison requests that this court find that in order to be 
evicted as a nuisance, a tenant must continuously or repeatedly 
engage in behavior that substantially and unreasonably, in light 
of the circumstances surrounding the tenancy, interferes with the 
rights of another of the landlord's tenants. 
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POINT THREE 
MORRISON'S ACTS DID NOT AMOUNT TO A NUISANCE 
By applying the standards discussed above, this court should 
find as a matter of law that Morrison's actions did not 
constitute a nuisance. At the center of Sorensen's complaint was 
the allegation that Morrison interfered with his business. It 
should be noted that the parties signed a residential lease and 
therefore Sorensen could not reasonably expect an atmosphere that 
would allow business activities. [R. 44-46] Business dealings 
in a house with two other roommates is an unusual practice and 
Sorensen's behavior was a nuisance as to Morrison. 
This was a situation where three roommates chose to move in 
together. [R. 26, 34] In such a situation each roommate needed 
to make special accommodations for the others. Nevertheless in 
this case Sorensen expected to hold business meetings in the 
home. [R. 44-46] This was an unrealistic expectation. Sorensen 
considered the usual activities of residential living an 
interference. While it is clear that the roommates were not 
getting along, Morrison's actions were not repeatedly invasive to 
the point where an eviction should have been ordered. As 
Morrison suggested, mediation may have been a fitting response to 
this situation, an eviction was not. 
Sorensen complained that Morrison boiled turkey parts on the 
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stove all night creating a fire hazard, lost telephone messages, 
removed a note from the front door, interfered with his sleep and 
in general interfered with his business. [R. 44-46] Viewed in 
the context of a residential rental agreement, Morrison's actions 
were not seriously and repeatedly invasive of Sorensen's tenancy. 
Cooking, watching television and typing are usual 
residential activities, yet to Sorensen they were a source of 
interference with his business. Morrison testified that once she 
was made aware that her typing was disruptive, she ceased that 
activity. [R. 46] She testified that the reason she was boiling 
turkey parts for broth at night was that she felt uncomfortable 
using the kitchen when her roommates were around and that she did 
what she could to avoid them and to avoid conflict. [R. 46] 
Finally, Morrison testified that she did remove a note from the 
front door of the premises and she admitted sending letters to 
Sorensen proposing mediation and to the landlord explaining the 
ongoing situation. [R. 45-46] Morrison testified that she 
removed the note for the purpose of showing that note to the 
property owner to prove a business was being run on the premises. 
[R. 45] She further testified that she sent letters to the 
landlord and Sorensen in hopes of resolving the conflicts between 
the roommates. [R. 45-46] Morrison's activities were reasonable 
under the circumstances and cannot be characterized as seriously 
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invasive of Sorensenfs tenancy. 
With the circumstances surrounding this tenancy in mind, and 
after finding that Morrison's actions were not seriously or 
repeatedly invasive of Sorensen's rights, the trial court should 
have held, as a matter of law, that Morrison was not a nuisance. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should overturn the decision of the lower court 
because Sorensen is not a landlord and therefore is not entitled 
to relief under the unlawful detainer statute. 
This court should clarify the nuisance standard applicable 
to unlawful detainer actions and should hold, by applying such a 
standard to the facts of this case, and given the facts as 
determined by the trial court, that Morrison was not a nuisance. 
Morrison asks this court to reverse the decision of the 
Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ Tday of dfrlJ[
 1994. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
m/. ERI^^ITTELSTADT 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) m aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child cus-
tody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity, 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction* 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 19» 
*v.v>.? m a » MJXC* 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than 
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, 
after the expiration of the specified term or pe-
riod for which it is let to him, which specified 
term or period, whether established by express or 
implied contract, or whether written or parol, 
shall be terminated without notice at the expira-
tion of the specified term or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an 
indefinite time with monthly or other periodic 
rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in per-
son or by subtenant after the end of any 
month or period, in cases where the owner, 
his designated agent, or any successor in es-
tate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to 
the end of that month or period, has served 
notice requiring him to quit the premises at 
the expiration of that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he 
remains in possession of the premises after 
the expiration of a notice of not less than five 
days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after default in the payment of 
any rent and after a notice in writing requiring 
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the 
surrender of the detained premises, has re-
mained uncomplied with for a period of three 
days after service, which notice may be served at 
any time after the rent becomes due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased 
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, 
or commits or permits waste on the premises, or 
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful busi-
ness on or in the premises, or when he suffers, 
permits, or maintains on or about the premises 
any nuisance, including nuisance as defined in 
Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after 
service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; 
or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to per-
form any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, 
other than those previously mentioned, and after 
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the 
surrender of the property, served upon him and 
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days 
after service. Within three days after the service 
of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual 
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the 
term, or other person interested in its contin-
uance may perform the condition or covenant and 
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except 
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease 
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be per-
formed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a 
mobile home is determined under Title 57, Chapter 
16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsec-
tion 78-36-3(1 )(d) are not applicable to nuisance ac-
tions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16 ADDENDUM 2-] 
onlv. 
78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against 
undertenant. 
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those 
prescribed in this chapter to obtain possession of the 
premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful 
detention of the premises underlet to him. 1953 
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alt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OP UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
2RRY SORENSEN, 
vs. 
[RIAM MORRISON, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 930013247 CV 
1 Judge Hutchings 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for hearing the 2nd day of 
icember, 1993, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding and plaintiff appearing 
person and by counsel James H. Deans/ and defendant appearing in person and by 
tunsel Eric Mittelstadt, and the court having heard the testimony and arguments and 
ving considered the evidence and good cause appearing now enters its Findings of 
ct and Concluions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff and defendant are co-tenants and roommates at 7383 
uth Union Park Avenue, Midvale, Utah. 
2. That plaintiff has served defendant with the 3-Day Notice to Vacate 
ted November 4, 1993 attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's complaint. 
3. That plaintiff may proceed against defendant although they are 
-tenants, in nuisance pursuant to Section 78-38-1 U.C.A. and the landlord is not a 
pessary party in this action, -jftu*^  <•$ <Z Cc\Ac(V$fc\A <J^ fCUjUV& fe tM \t& 
Ccacky^ ^ f e t u Sr>c\«^m^_ ^ ^ 
ADDENDUM 4 - 1 
4. That plaintiff and his witnesses testified to the items of nuisance 
sted in the nuisance notice• 
5. That defendant testified that she was not a nuisance. 
6. That defendant did disrupt plaintiff's business activities and on at 
>ast 25 occasions did not pass telephone messages on to plaintiff. 
7. That defendant did remove a note intended for plaintiff's business 
ssociates. 
8. That defendant did unplug plaintiff's answering machine. 
9. That defendant did conduct activities that interfered with 
Laintiff's sleep. 
10. That defendant created a fire hazard in the premises by leaving the 
urners on the stove on. 
11. That defendant has interfered with plaintiff's relationship with 
is landlord by sending the landlord letters alleging that plaintiff used drugs. 
12. That all of these factors combined together persuades the court 
.hat although it is a close case/ that plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that defendant is a nuisance as defined by Section 78-38-1 U.C.A. and that 
:he nuisance can be abated by terminating defendant's tenancy. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That defendant's conduct constituted a nuisance and she must vacate 
:he subject premises by December 17/ 1993 and thereafter plaintiff may enforce a Writ 
Df Restitution to the subject premises. 
2. That defendant is to pay her portion of the rent due the landlord 
through December/ 1993 and thereafter plaintiff is to assume full responsibility for 
the lease and hold defendant harmless from any payment due under the lease and 
indemnify defendant for any non-performance of plaintiff under the lease. 
ADDENDUM 4-2 
3. That plaintiff is to post a $500.00 cash bond in landlord's favor 
unless landlord waives such a bond to secure plaintiff's performance under the lease. 
4. That plaintiff's counsel is to notify landlord of these proceedings. 
5. That the parties/ for the remaining days of defendant's tenancy/ are 
mutually restrained from annoying or harassing each other and are to comport 
themselves with courtesy towards each other. 
DATED this \ ( J day of December/ 1993. 
ADDENDUM 4-^ 
tMES H. DEANS, #846 
itorney foe Plaintiff 
10 South 700 East - #101 
lit Lake City/ Utah 84102 
slephone: 575-5005 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SRRY SORENSEN, 
VS. 
IRIAM MORRISON, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
i Civil No. 930013247 CV 
1 Judge Hutchings 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for hearing the 2nd day of 
lecember, 1993, the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings presiding and plaintiff appearing 
.n person and by counsel James H. Deans, and defendant appearing in person and by 
zounsel Eric Mittelstadt, and the court having heard the testimony and arguments and 
laving considered the evidence and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
}f Law and good cause appearing, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That defendant's conduct constituted a nuisance and she must vacate 
the subject premises by December 17, 1993 and thereafter plaintiff may enforce a Writ 
of Restitution to the subject premises. 
2. That defendant is to pay her portion of the rent due the landlord 
through December, 1993 and thereafter plaintiff is to assume full responsibility for 
the lease and hold defendant harmless from any payment due under the lease and 
indemnify defendant for any non-performance of plaintiff under the lease. 
ADDENDUM 5-1 
-2-
3. That plaintiff is to post a $500.00 cash bond in landlord's favor 
unless landlord waives such a bond to secure plaintiff's performance under the lease. 
4. That plaintiff's counsel is to notify landlord of these proceedings. 
5. That the parties/ for the remaining days of defendant's tenancy/ are 
nutually restrained from annoying or harassing each other and are to comport 
:hemselves with courtesy towards each other. 
DATED this day of December/ 1993. 
MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
ADDENDUM S-? 
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CBRTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Pindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
md Order of Restitution to the following/ postage prepaid/ this 
3rd day of December/ 1993 
Eric Mittelstadt 
Attorney for Defendant 
124 South 400 East - #400 
Salt Lake City, OT 84111 
^ 
